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PUNISHMENT VERSUS TREATMENT OF
THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Michigan originally enacted it in 1976, the guilty but mentally ill verdict presented a unique approach to the problematic relationship between mental illness and crime.' In essence, Michigan
I

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36 (1976). The Michigan statute provides:

(1) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a, the
defendant may be found "guilty but mentally ill" if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all
of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense.
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense.
(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that
offense.
Plea of guilty but mentally ill; conditions for acceptance. (2) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a and the defendant waives his
right to trial, by jury or by judge, the trial judge, with the approval of the prosecuting
attorney, may accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill in lieu of a plea of guilty or a plea
of nolo contendere. The judge may not accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill until,
with the defendant's consent, he has examined the report or reports prepared pursuant to
section 20a, held a hearing on the issue of the defendant's mental illness at which either
party may present evidence, and is satisfied that the defendant was mentally ill at the
time of the offense to which the plea is entered. The reports shall be made a part of the
record of the case.
Sentence; commitment to corrections department; evaluation and treatment; provision of treatment; discharge; report and recommendations to parole board; treatment as
condition for parole. (3) If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill or enters a plea to
that effect which is accepted by the court, the court shall impose any sentence which
could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense. If the defendant is committed to the custody of the department of corrections, he
shall undergo further evaluation and be given such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness or retardation. Treatment may be provided by the department of corrections or by the department of mental health after his transfer ...
Sections 1004 and 1006 of Act No. 258 of Public Acts of 1974 shall apply to the discharge
of such a defendant from a facility of the department of mental health to which he has
been admitted and shall apply to the return of such a defendant to the department of
corrections for the balance of the defendant's sentence. When a treating facility designated by either the department of corrections or the department of mental health discharges such a defendant prior to the expiration of his sentence, that treating facility
shall transmit to the parole board a report on the condition of the defendant which
contains the clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment, and the prognosis for
the remission of symptoms, the potential for recidivism and for the danger to himself or
the public, and recommendations for future treatment. In the event that the parole
board pursuant to law or administrative rules should consider him for parole, the board
shall consult with the treating facility at which the defendant is being treated or from
which he has been discharged and a comparable report on the condition of the defendant shall be filed with the board. If he is placed on parole by the parole board, his
treatment shall, upon recommendation of the treating facility, be made a condition of
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directed jurors to find defendants guilty but mentally ill if they believe
those defendants to have been mentally ill, but not insane, at the time of
the offense. 2 In addition to offering juries a middle ground between insanity acquittals and guilty verdicts, the new verdict appeared to prom3
ise treatment for those convicted under its terms.
During the seven years since Michigan enacted its statute, seven
more states have followed suit. 4 In almost all important respects, the
statutes are identical; there is, however, one significant difference. Six
states, including Michigan, require that imprisonment pursuant to a
guilty but mentally ill conviction be accompanied by such treatment as
is "psychiatrically indicated."' 5 Illinois and New Mexico alone direct
their Departments of Corrections to provide only such treatment as they
"deem necessary." '6 The Michigan Supreme Court has interpreted the
parole, and failure to continue treatment except by agreement with the designated facility and parole board shall be a basis for the institution of parole violation hearings.
Treatment as condition of probation; reports; discontinuation of treatment, violation; probation period; provision of treatment; motion to discontinue probation; report.
(4) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill is placed on probation under the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court pursuant to law, the trial judge, upon recommendation of the center for forensic psychiatry, shall make treatment a condition of probation.
Reports as specified by the trial judge shall be filed with the probation officer and the
sentencing court. Failure to continue treatment, except by agreemeht with the treating
agency and the sentencing court, shall be a basis for the institution of probation violation
hearings. The period of probation shall not be for less than 5 years and shall not be
shortened without receipt and consideration of a forensic psychiatric report by the sentencing court. Treatment shall be provided by an agency of the department of mental
health, or with the approval of the sentencing court and at individual expense, by private agencies, private physicians, or other mental health personnel. A psychiatric report
shall be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing court every 3 months during
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition to discontinue probation is made by
the defendant, the probation officer shall request a report as specified from the center for
forensic psychiatry or any other facility certified by department of mental health for the
performance of forensic psychiatric evaluation.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.030, 12.47.050 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 408
(1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 115-3(c), 1005-2-6
(1981); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-5 (1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 504.120, 504.130 (Supp.
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (Supp. 1982).
5 Seecstatutes for Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, and Kentucky cited supra note 4.
6 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 115-3(c), 1005-2-6
(Department of Corrections must provide only such treatment as it "determines" necessary).
The Illinois statute provides:
(c) When the defendant has asserted a defense of insanity, the court may find the defendant guilty but mentally ill if, after hearing all of the evidence, the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant:
(1) is guilty of the offense charged; and
(2) was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense; and
(3) was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-3.
It further provides for the sentencing and treatment of the guilty but mentally ill:
(a) After a plea or verdict of guilty but mentally ill . . . the court shall order a
presentence investigation and report. . . and shall set a date for a sentencing hearing.
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former standard to give its guilty but mentally ill inmates an "unequivocal statutory right to treatment."' 7 In Illinois and New Mexico, however, the scope of the right to treatment has yet to be determined. 8
Lacking an "unequivocal statutory right," guilty but mentally ill inmates in these two states may be forced to rely on unsettled constitutional rights to treatment generated by the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. 9
This Comment seeks to establish the parameters of the right to
The court may impose any sentence upon the defendant which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who had been convicted of the same offense without a
finding of mental illness.
(b) If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant who has been
found guilty but mentally ill, the defendant shall be committed to the Department of
Corrections, which shall cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning
the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness. The
Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary.
(c) The Department of Corrections may transfer the defendant's custody to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-8-5 of this Act.
(d)(1) The Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities shall return to the Department of Corrections any person committed to it pursuant to this Section whose sentence has not expired and whom the Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities deems no longer requires hospitalization for mental treatment, mental retardation, or addiction.
(2) The Department of Corrections shall notify the Director of Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities of the expiration of the sentence of any person transferred to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities under this
Section. If the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities determines that any such person requires further hospitatlization, it shall file an appropriate
petition for involuntary commitment pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code.
(e)(1) All persons found guilty but mentally ill, whether by plea or by verdict, who
are placed on probation or sentenced to a term of periodic imprisonment or a period of
conditional discharge shall be required to submit to a course of mental treatment prescribed by the sentencing court.
(2) The course of treatment prescribed by the court shall reasonably assure the
defendant's satisfactory progress in treatment or habilitation and for the safety of the
defendant and others. The court shall consider terms, conditions and supervision which
may include, but need not be limited to, notification and discharge of the person to the
custody of his family, community adjustment programs, periodic checks with legal authorities and outpatient care and utilization of local mental health, or developmental
disabilities facilities.
(3) Failure to continue treatment, except by agreement with the treating person
or agency and the court, shall be a basis for the institution of probation revocation proceedings.
(4) The period of probation shall be in accordance with Section 5-6-2 of this Act
and shall not be shortened without receipt and consideration of such psychiatric or psychological report or reports as the court may require.
Id. at § 1005-2-6.
7 People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 637, 388 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1980).
8 Although Illinois' statute was passed in 1981 and has been used to convict approximately sixty defendants, the Illinois courts have not yet addressed this issue. The New Mexico statute is still too recently passed to have generated significant litigation.
9 For further discussion, see inra section V.
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treatment due a person found guilty but mentally ill in Illinois. 10 Although state and federal courts have dealt extensively with the constitutional rights of prisoners to various kinds of treatment, 1 ' the
incarceration of those found guilty but mentally ill presents substantially different concerns and a much stronger right to treatment.
States adopting the guilty but mentally ill verdict have been responding largely to the perceived inadequacies of the insanity defense. 12
After discussing the relationship between the insanity defense and the
guilty but mentally ill verdict, this Comment will describe the operation
of Illinois' verdict and then compare the Illinois law with its Michigan
predecessor.' 3 The final sections will address how the courts may and
should analyze treatment rights for those found guilty but mentally ill.

II.

THE INSANITY DEFENSE

Underlying the insanity defense is the assumption that those who
commit criminal acts while insane should not be held criminally responsible for their behavior. To the extent that mental impairment is, in
some sense, "responsible" for an individual's proscribed behavior, treatment, and not punishment, is acknowledged to be society's appropriate
response. 14 Judge Bazelon summarized the rationale for the defense:
"Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot
impose blame."' 5 In contrast, society punishes actions that are not
traceable to mental illness or another acceptable defense.
Unfortunately, modern medicine is currently incapable of precisely
identifying the psychological causes of human behavior. One commen10 Textual discussion is limited to comparing the Illinois and Michigan statutes because
they furnished the models for the other six states. Michigan's unequivocal statutory right to
treatment should provide the basis for similar rights in Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana
and Kentucky. The absence of a statutory right to treatment in Illinois and New Mexico
should give rise to the same constitutional right to treatment. See infia section V.
I1 See infia text accompanying notes 96-128.
12 See incfa
notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
13 This Comment will not focus on the other statutes because of their similarity to the
Michigan and Illinois counterparts and because of the absence of significant litigation in this
area. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1982); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (1982); see supra note 10.
14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ("the problem is to
discriminate between the cases where a punitive-correctional disposition is appropriate and
those in which a medical-custodial disposition is the only kind that the law should allow").
Goldstein states that the insanity defense
becomes the occasional device through which an offender is found to be inappropriate
for the social purposes served by the criminal law. He is too much unlike the man in the
street to permit his example to be useful for purposes of deterrence. He is too far removed from normality to make us angry with him. But because he is sick rather than
evil, society is cast as specially responsible for him and obligated to make him better.
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 15 (1967).
15 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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tator has therefore summarized the controversy over the insanity defense
as "lack of a societal consensus on the definition of mental illness and its
relationship to criminal behavior." 16 Until advances in medical science
allow us to trace an antisocial act directly to the actor's mental illness
rather than to his moral deficiency, there will continue to be confusion
and disagreement about whether treatment or punishment is appropriate. In the meantime, "[t]he key to the insanity defense is probably to
be found in the extent to which it must serve as a bridge. . . between
17
medical science and . . . complex social objectives."
Under virtually every insanity standard, 18 the insanity defense
presents substantial problems. Both the implementation of the defense
and the premises underlying it have been severely criticized, 19 and attempts to eliminate the defense altogether seem to have been quelled
only by the probability that such action would be held unconstitutional.20 Nevertheless, critics of the defense continue to seek ways to mitigate some of its perceived consequences. Although many of these
arguments and proposals are outside the purview of this Comment,
some of the defense's limitations bear upon the motivation behind and
the goals of the guilty but mentally ill verdict.
16 Comment, Guilty But Mentally Il."A Reasonable Compromisefor Pennsylvania, 85 DICK. L.
RE,.. 289, 291 (1981).
17 A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 90.

18 The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code "expressed a rule which has become
the dominant force in the law pertaining to the defense of insanity." United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The ALI test provides that "[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The ALI test has been adopted by at least five states, 21 AM. JuR.
2d CRIMINAL LAW § 63, and it is the rule in all but one of the federal circuits. Brawner, 471
F.2d at 979.
19 The problems with the insanity defense are best illustrated by the recurring movements
to abolish the defense. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity Defense-Why Not?, 72 YALE
L.J. 853 (1963); Morris, Psychiatq and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 516
(1968) ("[t]he defense of insanity is moribund and should in the decades ahead be interred");
Comment, supra note 16, at 302 ("Abolition of the insanity defense would at once eliminate
the confusion, tension and illogical distinctions inherent in the law of insanity as it now
exists.").
20 See State v. Strasberg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1921); see also Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 372 n.9 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (insanity defense is basic to the American system); Weiner, "Guilty But Mentally Ill.' New Plea in Criminal Cases Fools Public, Chicago
Sun-Times, Aug. 5, 1981, at 52 [hereinafter cited as Weiner, 'Guilty But Mentally Ill']; Thompson, A Message to the Eighty-Second General Assembly, State of Illinois, "Technicalities" in
the Criminal Justice Process: Closing the Loopholes Through Which the Guilty Escape 8
(Apr. 23, 1981). For arguments advocating abolition of insanity defense, see H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); B. WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1963) [hereinafter cited as B. WoorTEN, CRIME]; B. WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1978) [hereinafter cited as B. WOOrTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE]; Morris, supra
note 19, at 514.
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The guilty but mentally ill verdict was largely a response to the
alleged inadequacy of the procedures for committing and, ultimately,
releasing defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity.2 1 Forceful
arguments have been made that society should be protected from one
who commits forbidden acts,2 2 whether or not he or she is "responsible"
for those acts. But because such a defendant has not been convicted of a
crime, society must justify the insanity acquittee's confinement on other
grounds. 23 To confine one who is not criminally responsible, the state
must show that person to be presently insane and dangerous to him- or
herself or to others.24 Since this determination is made subsequent to the
criminal prosecution, many states automatically commit those acquitted
by reason of insanity for temporary observation periods pending a hearing on present sanity and dangerousness. 25 Civil commitment of indefi26
nite duration follows a finding of present insanity and dangerousness.
In theory, the length of commitment depends on continuing findings of insanity and dangerousness; when hospital staff can no longer
support such findings, the insanity acquittee must be released. In fact,
significant incentives militate against prompt release of these individuals, long after release is warranted under the law. Hospital staff may err
on the side of caution, understandably reluctant to risk the possibility
21 Thompson, supra note 20, at 7-11; Thompson hopes to reform law on mentally ill
criminals, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 23, 1983, § 1, at 16; Weiner, 'Guilty But Mentaly Ill;,'supra
note 20, at 52; Editorial, Why Not Guilty Though Insane?, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 20, 1977, § 3,
at 2, col. 1.
22 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 20, at n.51; T. SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHYIATRY
138-46 (1963); B. WOOTTON, CRIME, supra note 20, at 52 ("an action does not become innocuous merely because whoever performed it meant no harm").
23 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (even prisoners are entitled to a hearing meeting

due process standards before they are transferred to a mental hospital); Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (past dangerousness proven by
commission of prohibited act is not in itself a conclusive indication that the defendant qualifies for commitment); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962) (insanity acquittal does
not justify continued confinement without additional evidence concerning present mental
condition); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Allen v. Radack, 426 F. Supp.
1052 (D.S.D. 1977); State v. Clemons, 100 Ariz. 79, 515 P.2d 324 (1973); Wilson v. State, 259
Ind. 375, 386, 287 N.E.2d 875, 881 (1972) (insanity acquittee who is committed is subject to
the same standards for release as any civilly committed individual); People v. McQuillan, 392
Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974) (automatic commitment of insanity acquittees violates due
process and equal protection); People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d
654 (1966); see also MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP., Special Report, Legal Issues in Slate Mental
Health Care: ProposalsforChange, 654, 655 (Mar.-Apr. 1978) (automatic commitment for substantial periods without notice, assistance of counsel, and a judicial hearing conflicts with a
growing body of precedent holding that such procedures are constitutionally required).
24 See People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 536, 221 N.W.2d 569, 580 (1974); Wilson v.
State, 259 Ind. 375, 386, 287 N.E.2d 875, 881 (1972); MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP., sura note
23, at 655.
25 See MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP., supra note 23, at 654.
26 Id.
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that one who previously committed an anti-social act, whatever the
cause, will do so again. 27 Furthermore, limited resources may prevent
timely recognition of a patient's improved condition. 28 Consequently,
an insanity acquittee's civil commitment often results in actual incarceration for a period far longer than that which would be served for the
2 9
offense charged.
Proponents of the guilty but mentally ill verdict perceive the problem of release quite differently. They claim that mental health facilities
routinely release insanity acquittees too early and fail to consider adequately the risk to the community that those released may prove to be
dangerous. 30 Supporters cite instances of repeated, violent criminal be27 Professor Goldstein found that "[a] surprisingly large number [of jurisdictions] treat
persons acquitted as insane as members of an 'exceptional class,' requiring stricter standards
for release than the general run of mental patients." A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 153-54.
Indeterminate commitment may thus become permanent detention. Thornberry and
Jacoby, in THE CRIMINALLY INSANE, similarly found that "[t]o avoid. . . negative political
consequences, the prediction that a patient will not be dangerous after release is rarely made.
Instead, the clinicians at maximum security hospitals routinely overpredict the rate of dangerousness among their patients. . . . 'The result of this practice is that as many as 20 harmless people are incarcerated for every one who will commit a violent act.'" T. THORNBERRY
&J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE 32 (1979) (quoting Steadman & Cocozza, "We Can't
Predict Who Is Dangerous," Psychology Today 32-35 (Jan. 1975)); see also American Weeky 4
(June 18, 1961) ("The notion that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity means an easy
way out is far from the truth. Indeed the odds favor such a person spending a longer period
of confinement in the hospital than if the sentence was being served in jail."); Kahn &
Raifman, Hospitalization Versus Imprisonment and the Znsanity Plea, 8 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 483,
488 (1981).
28 See supra note 27.
29 A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1975) (Stone posits
that incarceration pursuant to a successful insanity plea can be longer than the imprisonment
of one found guilty). The New York Times reported that a man accused of shoplifting, for
which he could have received a maximum jail term of one year, was acquitted by reason of
insanity. More than seven years later, he was still confined to a mental institution. New York
Times, Oct. 3, 1982, at 23, col. 6. But see Kahn & Raifman, supra note 27, at 488 (the authors
conclude that no significant difference exists between the amount of time served by those
found guilty and imprisoned and those hospitalized pursuant to an insanity plea).
30 Reagan Advisor Edwin Meese EnunciatesAdministration'sCrime Control Goals, 12 CRIM. JUST.
NEWSLETTER 4 (1981) (Meese advocates elimination of the insanity defense and thus "ridding the streets of some of the most dangerous people that are out there, that are committing
a disproportionate number of crimes."); Sullivan, Dangerous Mental PatientsMust Not be.Freed,
Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 16, 1981, at 32, col. 1; Taylor, Issue and Debate.: The Plea of Insanit
and Its Use in CriminalCases, New York Times, July 27, 1981, at 9 (critics of the defense claim
that rather than being confined for long periods, people are getting out of mental institutions
after fairly short periods, sometimes to go on to commit further crimes); Locin, Thompson Hopes
to Reform Law on Mentally Ill Criminals, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 23, 1981 §1, at 16 (law enforcement authorities have decried the insanity defense because the perpetrators of often violent
crimes are sometimes released from mental institutions after only short periods of treatment);
Fritsch, Plan OfZGrounds Passesfor Killer, Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1979, at 42; Editorial, Why
Not Cuilty Though Insane?, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 20, 1977, § 3, at 2, col. 1 (insanity defense is
inadequate because "[d]angerous individuals have returned to the streets too easily and too
soon").
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havior following release of those acquitted by reason of insanity. 3 1
In fact, instances of repeated violent criminal behavior among
members of this class are relatively rare. Two studies have examined the
crime rates among criminally committed individuals released into the
community pursuant to court orders requiring new hearings as to their
sanity and dangerousness. 32 Although institutional health care staff anticipated high rates of recidivism and violence, the studies found that
these were vast overpredictions; in fact, few of the subjects exhibited
dangerous behavior. 33 The more recent study concluded that "[a]n image of the[se] patients that is based on the premise that the majority...
are and will be dangerous is erroneous. ' 34 Even those who advocate
abolition of the insanity defense acknowledge that release of insanity
acquittees does not affect the crime rate. 35 Nevertheless, those occasions
when insanity acquittees again violate the criminal law trigger an ex36
treme public reaction against the insanity defense.
III.

THE ILLINOIS STATUTE: HISTORY AND OPERATION

Between 1976 and 1977, public outrage over post-release criminal
behavior by two insanity acquittees spurred the creation of Illinois'
guilty but mentally ill alternative.3 7 Without citing statistics, Governor
Thompson blamed the insanity laws for failure to prevent mentally ill
offenders from repeating violent crimes.38 He presented the new verdict
as a constitutional means of dealing with mentally ill offenders: "The
fact that we are constitutionally precluded from abolishing the insanity
defense does not mean that we cannot provide for alternative classifications to deal with offenders who are not legally insane but suffer from a
mental illness."'3 9 Thus, while acknowledging the protected status of the
31 See supra note 30.
32

H.

STEADMAN

& J.

COCOZZA, CAREERS

OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE

(1974); T.

THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, supra note 27.

33 H. STEADMAN & J. CocozzA, supra note 32, at 158; T. THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY,
supra note 27, at 201, 202.
34 T. THORNBERRY &J. JACOBY,supra note 27, at 202;see also Weiner, 'Guilty But Mentally
fll,'supra note 20, at 52; Glieck, GettingAway With Murder, New York Times, Aug. 21, 1978, at
21-22 (the number of crimes committed by people previously acquitted by reason of insanity
is small).
35 Taylor, The Plea of Insanity andIts Use in Criminal Cases, New York Times, July 27, 1981,
at 9 (quoting Norval Morris).
36 See supra note 30.
37 See Weiner, 'Guilty But Mentally Ill,'supra note 20, at 52; Thompson, supra note 20, at 7.
For the text of the Illinois statute, see supra note 6.
38 Thompson, supra note 20, at 7 ("Our existing insanity laws do not protect citizens from
convicted felons with a history of violence and mental illness. It is for this reason that the
insanity defense has been called '[t]he chronic scandal of American criminal law.' ") (quoting
M. FLEMING, OF CRIMES AND RIGHTS 202 (1978)).
39 Thompson, supra note 20, at 8.
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insanity defense, the Illinois legislature has sought to prevent some of
the consequences of its application, in particular the perceived problem
of premature release.
That premature release was a significant catalyst is clear from the
purposes profferred in support of the Act. Predominant among these
was protecting society from violent crime. As Governor Thompson concluded, "Most importantly, [the Act] is designed 'to protect the public
from violence inflicted by persons with mental ailments who slipped
through the cracks in the criminal justice system.' ",40
Governor Thompson also emphasized the importance of the statute's mandatory treatment function. He asserted that, in addition to
incarceration for the crime charged, "[t]he Department of Corrections
must provide appropriate psychiatric, psychological, or other treatment
to restore the offender to full capacity, and make periodic examinations
4
of the nature, extent and continuance of the offender's condition."1 '
The Governor's treatment theme was echoed by other proponents
of the bill. During the final debate in the Illinois Senate, the bill's major
sponsor described a defendant's disposition under the statute as follows:
"A guilty but mentally ill defendant can be. . .sentenced exactly as a
healthy defendant charged with the same crime except that his sentence
''
must include psychiatric and psychological treatment or counselling. 42 At the
close of this debate, Senate Bill 867, providing for the verdict of guilty
43
but mentally ill, was passed by a vote of fifty-five to zero.
The rationale for the new classification thus rests on the dual aims
of protecting society from violent crime 44 and treating offenders for the
mental illnesses which affect their behavior. 45 In spite of the rhetorical
40 Id. (quoting People v. Seefeld, 95 Mich. App. 197, 199, 290 N.W.2d 123, 124 (1980)).
41

Id. at 9.

42 Senate Floor Debate, Senate Bill 867, at 127 (May 27, 1981) (3rd reading). A few pages

later in the transcript, the senator reiterated that treatment was mandated under the Bill.
43 Id. at 135.
44 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
45 See Thompson, supra note 20; Senate Floor Debate, Senate Bill 867, at 127, 131 (May
27, 1981) (3rd reading). Commentators have focused on probable scenarios in which juries
use the guilty but mentally ill verdict to balance society's interest in institutionalizing offenders against the interests of mentally ill defendants. See Corrigan & Grano, CriminalLaw, 1976
Annual Surv,y ofMichigan Law, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 473, 479 (1979); Comment, supra note 15, at
309; Comment, Insaniy--Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity." An Aggregate Approach to
Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROc. 357, 381 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Insaniy].
Some commentators fear that this balancing process may obfuscate the distinction between
legal insanity and mental illness. In their desire to balance, juries may be led to "avoid the
difficult responsibilities of an insanity acquittal by finding the defendant guilty but mentally
ill. In short, juries may misuse the verdict by ignoring substantial evidence that the essential
element of mens rea has not been proved." Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historicaland
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 53 U. DET. J. URB. L. 471, 492-93 (1976). But as one commentator
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commitment to treatment, 4 6 however, the operational provisions of the
Illinois statute reveal that the actual commitment is rather thin.
Under the statute's terms a defendant may be found guilty but
mentally ill if he or she so pleads, or if he or she pleads not guilty by
reason of insanity and the finder of fact determines beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the acts charged and that the defendant "was not legally insane at the time of the commission of those
'47
acts but that he was mentally ill at such time.
Illinois defines as insane one who, "as a result of mental disease or
defect. . . lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."' 48
In contrast, mental illness is defined as a
substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which afflicted a person
at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his behavior
or is unable to conform his conduct to the
49
requirements of law.
Upon conviction, the presiding judge is authorized to "impose any
sentence upon the defendant which could be imposed pursuant to law
upon a defendant who had been convicted of the same offense without a
finding of mental illness." '50 If a prison sentence is imposed, the court
then transfers jurisdiction to the Department of Corrections.
Once the Department of Corrections receives custody of the defendant, the statute provides that the Department "shall cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the nature, extent,
continuance and treatment of the defendant's mental illness. The Department of Corrections shall provide such special psychiatric, psychological, or other counselling and treatment for the defendant as it
detemines necessa7. '"5 In addition, the Department of Corrections may
institute proceedings to transfer the defendant to the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities [hereinafter
DMHDD]. 52 The law, however, requires that "the [DMHDD] shall return to the Department of Corrections any person committed to it pursuant to this section whose sentence has not expired and whom the
noted, this fear may be unwarranted and premature: "The possibility of future abuse cannot
justify a finding that the statute is unconsitutional at present." Id. at 493.
46 See Thompson, supra note 20; Floor Debate, Senate Bill 867 (May 27, 1981) (3rd
reading).
47 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-3(c) (1981). For text of statute, see supra note 6.
48 Id. ch. 38, § 6-2(a); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1044(1).
49 ILL. REV. STAT. 38, § 6-2(d).
50 Id. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(a).
51 Id. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b)(emphasis added).
52 Id. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(c).
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[DMHDD] deems no longer requires hospitalization. ' 53
The statute addresses the problem of premature release in the provision allowing for criminal sentencing, and by the requirement that
those released from hospitalization must be returned to the Department
of Corrections for the balance of their terms.5 4 In theory, every insanity
acquittee is released immediately upon becoming "sane or safe." One
found guilty but mentally ill, however, must finish the entire prison
term, either in prison or in a hospital, despite a finding of mental fitness
or lack of dangerousness. 55 If one assumes that a criminal sentence will
always exceed any term of civil commitment, 56 the proponents' purpose
of protecting society from the insane and dangerous is fulfilled.
The treatment purpose espoused by the drafters, in contrast, receives little support from the operational provisions of the statute. By
requiring the Department of Corrections to provide only such treatment
"as it determines necessary," 57 the language of the statute quite clearly
contemplates that a defendant found guilty but mentally ill may receive
little or no treatment. As this language suggests, the Act apparently
vests the Department of Corrections with complete discretion over the
type and duration of treatment for incarcerated individuals.
By placing the treatment decision wholly in the discretion of the
Department of Corrections, the statute increases the likelihood that
mentally ill offenders will receive little, if any, treatment. Given the
limited mental health facilities currently available in prisons5 8 and the
fact that no additional appropriation for this purpose accompanied the
bill, 59 it seems likely that the Department of Corrections will find treatment to be "necessary" only in particularly severe cases. 60 Consequently,
53 Id. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(d).
54 Id. ch. 38, §§ 1005-2-6(a), 1005-2-d(1).
55 Id. ch. 38, § 1005-2-d(2).
56 At least one recent study indicates, however, that there is no significant difference between the lengths of confinement of hospitalized and imprisoned individuals. See Kahn &
Raifman, supra note 27.
57 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b)(1981).
58 According to the director of the Institute for Psychiatry and the Law, the sixty Illinois
defendants found to be guilty but mentally ill have been sent to the Menard Correctional
Facility, where the evaluation or treatment they receive does not differ from that received by
other Menard inmates. Interview with Barbara Weiner, Director of the Institute of Psychiatry and the Law (Apr. 4, 1983).
59 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 13, 1981, § 1, at 22 (letter to editor from R. Wettstein) ("the act
does not appropriate additional funding for the needed treatment"); Weiner, 'Guilty But Mentally Ill,' supra note 20, at 52. Ms. Weiner confirmed that no funding accompanied the bill
and that there have been no additional funds allocated in the three years since the bill's
passage. Interview with Barbara Weiner, Director of the Institute of Psychiatry and the Law
(Apr. 4, 1983).
60 See M. McCormick, Litigating the Constitutionality of GBMI: The Michigan Experience 183 (1980)(unpublished manuscript).
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the Department of Corrections may deem necessary only that treatment
which is available to all inmates, or it may limit treatment to that which

is necessary for containment purposes. 6 1 Either of these possible interpretations of the statutory language would eviscerate the statute's treat-

ment function.
The significance of the Illinois statute's treatment language be-

comes clear upon comparison with the parallel provision in Michigan's
guilty but mentally ill statute. As the following section will show, the
Michigan counterpart generates a substantial statutory right to treat-

ment which has been recognized by the Michigan courts. It stands in
marked contrast to the potentially illusory protection provided by the
Illinois legislature.
IV.

THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE

The Illinois legislators were not drafting on a clean slate. When
Governor Thompson proposed the guilty but mentally ill verdict, he
was plainly influenced by the Michigan model and suggested that in
62
enacting the verdict, "[w]e should follow Michigan's lead."
In almost all respects, the two statutes are identical. 63 There is,
however, one dramatic difference. Like the Illinois statute, a guilty but
mentally ill verdict in Michigan authorizes the judge to impose any
sentence which would be appropriate for one found guilty of the offense.

But if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, Michigan
requires the Department of Corrections to ensure that "the defendant
. . .shall undergo further evaluation and be given such treatment as is
64 As we have seen, the parallel provision in Illipyschiatricated."
61 Id. McCormick suggests that the distinction between the Illinois and Michigan statutes
would be particularly significant "if the Department of Corrections interprets necessary treatment as that treatment needed for containment purposes, rather than treatment for the wellbeing of the individual defendant." Id.; see also supra note 58.
62 Thompson, supra note 20, at 7, 8.
63 Both statutes require the jury or judge to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the acts charged and that he was mentally ill but not legally insane at
the time of the offense. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-3(c)(3) (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.1059(1) (1978). The statutes similarly define as insane an individual who "as a result of
mental illness. . . lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 10051-11 (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1044(1) (1978).
Although Michigan's guilty but mentally ill statute does not contain a definition, mental
illness is defined in the Public Health Title as "a substantial disorder of thought or mood
which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to
cope with the ordinary demands of life." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.800 (400a) (1978). This
definition would presumably be imported into Michigan's guilty but mentally ill statute. Illinois and Michigan thus have virtually identical standards for determining whether a defendant is guilty but mentally ill.
64 MICH. COMP. LAws § 768.36 (1976) (emphasis added).
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nois vests in the Department of Corrections discretion to "provide such
. . . treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary. '6 5 Illinois'
subjective standard diminishes the protection promised by the verdict's
proponents by increasing the probability that defendants with acknowledged mental impairment will receive no treatment, or minimal treat66
ment, throughout their incarceration.
In contrast, the Michigan statute on its face sets up an external,
objective standard for determination of the treatment due to a guilty
but mentally ill inmate. The Michigan courts faced with construing the
statute have accordingly recognized a statutory right to treatment for
guilty but mentally ill inmates.
In People v. McLeod,67 the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the guilty but mentally ill verdict and confirmed the
existence of a statutory right to treatment. Following McLeod's conviction, the trial judge held the statute unenforceable because she found
that the treatment psychiatrically indicated for the defendant would not
be available within the existing facilities and procedures of the Department of Corrections and the Department of Mental Health.6 8 She therefore found that the statute was "legally inert and cannot be given
judicial implementation for the reason that compliance with its provisions as to treatment is impossible and the court is thereby deprived of
its authority to enter a judgment of guilty but mentally ill or to sentence
'69
defendant thereunder.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding
that until the departments statutorily charged with responsibility for
providing treatment were given "a reasonable opportunity to comply
with the statutory mandate," no court could conclude that the statutory
mandate would be "impossible" to fulfill. 70 The Michigan Supreme
Court upheld the court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's judgment:
The reasons asserted by the trial judge. . . are premature in that they all
relate to speculation that the Department of Corrections or the Department of Mental Health will not pay heed to the statute. While future
events may prove the trial judge was correct in her surmise, to conclude
71
that compliance with the statute is 'impossible' is inaccurate.
Although the trial court's holding was reversed, the existence of a
65 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b) (1981).
66 See supra text accompanying notes 37-61.
67 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980), afig, 77 Mich. App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214
(1977).
68 Id. at 648-49, 288 N.W.2d at 909.
69 Id. at 649, 288 N.W.2d at 913.
70 Id.
71 407 Mich. at 652, 288 N.W.2d at 914 (quoting McLeod, 77 Mich. App. at 330, 258
N.W.2d at 216).
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statutorily created right to treatment was unquestioned by the highest
court.7 2 The Michigan Supreme Court explicitly found that "this new
statute grants the defendant, and other persons who are sentenced pursuant to this new verdict, an unequivocal statutory right to 'such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness . . . .
McLeod appears to have had a positive effect on treatment facilities
in the Michigan correctional system. The trial court's conclusion in McLeod rested in large part upon evidence given by the prison physician,
Dr. Dennis Jurczak 7 4 who had testified that the mental health facilities
available to prisoners at the time McLeod was to be incarcerated were
so inadequate as to make it unlikely at best that the defendant would
ever receive the treatment he required.7 5 The Michigan Supreme
Court's conclusion that the "statutory mandate for evaluation and treatment" had not yet been violated impliedly threatened that duly convicted and imprisoned defendants would have to be released if such
findings were ultimately made. Subsequently, the Michigan correctional
system underwent a significant improvement in its mental health facilities. In a letter written subsequent to his testimony at trial, Dr. Jurczak
informed an assistant county prosecutor that the treatment facilities currently available at certain Michigan institutions are reasonable and ade76
quate for the needs of the inmate population.
",7

Although the McLeod decision may not have been solely responsible
for these changes, it supplied some pressure to effect much-needed im72 Id.; see Grostick, The Constitutionality of Michigan Guily But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 188, 190 (1978) (the guilty but mentally ill verdict "may help insure that
convicted defendants who need treatment for mental illness will receive it"); Comment, supra
note 45, at 489 ("The mental illness determination is a matter of disposition: whether or not
the guilty party needs treatment."); Comment, Guilty But Mentalo,Il: A Retrealfom the Insanity
Defense, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 237, 254 (1981) ("Once a defendant is convicted under a guilty
but mentally ill statute he must be provided with an opportunity to receive psychiatric treatment in a prison hospital.'); Comment, supra note 15, at 309 ("The guilty but mentally ill
verdict enables the jury to openly convict the defendant. . . while ensuring that he receives
mental health treatment."); Comment, Insanity, supra note 45, at 354 n. 17 (Michigan's guilty
but mentally ill verdict "creates a statutory right to treatment'); Senator Frank Padavan,
11th District, New York State Senate, Memorandum in Support of New York's Proposed
G.B.M.I. Legislation (1979) (unpublished report) (cited in Comment, supra, at 254-55 n.137)
("This legislation was created so that a defendant with a diminished mental capacity. ., not
[sic] use the mental hygiene system as a short circuit to freedom, but rather will be sentenced
in accordance with the law and then afforded psychiatric treatment.').
73 407 Mich. at 652, 288 N.W.2d at 914.
74 People v. McLeod, No. 76-01672, 6 (Recorders Court Opinion, Detroit, Mich., Sept. 21,
1976),rev'd, 77 Mich. App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977), aj'd,407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909
(1980). The trial court judge quoted Dr. Jurczak's testimony: "We do not have the wherewithal to implement the legislation regarding the treatment of the mentally ill in the correction system." Id.
75 Id. at 5-6.
76 Brown & Wittner, Annual Surve, of Michigan Law-Criminal Law, 25 WAYNE L. REv.
335, 361 n.159 (1979).
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provements. Nevertheless, the inadequacy of prison mental health
treatment remains a generic flaw. As Dr. Jurczak confirmed in his most
'77
recent statement, "[W]e are still a long way from being ideal.
The dimensions of a right to treatment under the statute in the
event of official indifference or proven institutional inadequacy remain
unclear. McLeod leaves this matter unresolved, holding only that there
78
could be no predetermination that treatment would be inadequate.
Subsequent cases did attempt to describe more precisely the dimensions of the statutory right recognized in McLeod. In People v. Sharf,79
the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether failure to provide
treatment justified recission of a defendant's guilty but mentally ill
plea. Sharif had plea bargained from a first degree charge of criminal
sexual conduct down to a guilty but mentally ill plea for second degree
sexual conduct.8 0 He contended that the trial judge had promised that
a guilty but mentally ill verdict would unconditionally entitle him to
treatment and, when treatment was not forthcoming, claimed the right
to change his plea. The court of appeals determined, however, that no
promise of treatment had actually been made, and that failure to give
treatment which had never been promised did not constitute a violation
of the statutory mandate. 8 1 On these findings, the court of appeals ruled
that the plea was binding.
This result is not necessarily inconsistent with McLeod's "unequivocal statutory right" to treatment. The court of appeals in McLeod correctly concluded that treatment is not mandated by the statute in every
case, but only in those cases where treatment is "psychiatrically indicated."' 82 A trial judge at the plea stage may not be qualified to determine whether treatment is so indicated; the statutory right would thus
be activated at a later stage, upon imprisonment.83 In any case, the
77 Id.
78 McLeod, 407 Mich. at 652-53, 288 N.W.2d at 914. Other cases have suggested that
inadequate treatment may be remedied through a mandamus action. People v. Sorna, 88
Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979); People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326, 287 N.W.2d
223 (1979); see also Corrigan & Grano, supra note 45, at 478; cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
79 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978).
80 Id. at 198, 274 N.W.2d at 18.
81 Id. at 198, 274 N.W.2d at 19.
82 McLeod, 407 Mich. at 652, 288 N.W.2d at 922.
83 The system as it now exists requires ajudge to make a finding concerning mental illness
for the purpose of establishing criminal liability, yet it forbids the same judge to determine
whether treatment is required for defendants found guilty but mentally ill. It is interesting to
note that judges are not always so constrained; for example, they frequently require treatment
as a condition of probation. See R.O. DAwsON, SENTENCING 114-15 (1969). Although this
appears to be an implausible distinction, it has long been acknowledged that legal and medical determinations of mental illness require different expertise and involve different standards. On this theory, the treatment decision is a medical, not legal, decision, and is properly
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holding in SharT does not alter the statutory requirement that such
treatment as is psychiatrically indicated is due to every defendant imprisoned pursuant to its provisions.
The Michigan Court of Appeals also rebuffed an equal protection
challenge to the statute's constitutionality in People v. Soma .84 The statute distinguishes between insanity and mental illness for the purpose of
determining criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, the court justified the
guilty but mentally ill classification as a valid intermediate category to
deal with situations where a defendant's mental illness "does not deprive
him of substantial capacity sufficient to satisfy the insanity test but does
warrant treatmentin addition to incarceration. The fact that these distinctions
are not clear-cut does not warrant a finding of no rational basis to make
them. '85 The court thus found the statute to be valid under the equal
protection clause in part because it mandated treatment for the continuing mental illness of those found guilty but mentally ill.
To date, only one case has sought directly to enforce the statute's
treatment function. In People v. Mack ,86 the defendant pled guilty but
mentally ill to a charge of manslaughter. The trial court accepted her
plea, sentenced her to eight to fifteen years in prison and specifically
directed the Department of Corrections to provide her with intensive
counseling and alcohol therapy. The defendant appealed her conviction
on the grounds that she was not receiving the treatment mandated by
the trial judge. The court of appeals ordered the trial court to hold a
new hearing to determine whether the defendant was receiving proper
care and to order the Department of Corrections to fully implement the
87
treatment program.
No state or federal court, however, has determined the dimensions
of Michigan's statutory right to treatment for a guilty but mentally ill
inmate whose sentencing judge does not order specific treatment; this
inmate may not be in the same positon as Mack. Michigan's right to
treatment must therefore not be dependent on explicit instructions from
the sentencing judge if those convicted under its terms are not to be in
precisely the same position as those simply found guilty.
Similar objectives underlie the guilty but mentally ill verdicts in
Michigan and Illinois. Both statutes ostensibly seek to protect the cornthe concern of doctors, not judges. As one commentator put it, "[f]or legal purposes, insanity
focuses on mens rea. Psychiatry, however, has developed independently of the law. Its categories and definitions of various mental diseases do not easily conform to legal necessities."
Comment, Insanity, supra note 45, at 487 n.60.
84 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
85 Id. at 360, 276 N.W.2d at 896 (emphasis added).
86 104 Mich. App. 560, 305 N.W.2d 264 (1981).
87 Id. at 562, 305 N.W.2d at 266.
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munity from repeated violent behavior and to treat defendants convicted under their terms. In the seven years since its passage, the
Michigan statute has clearly helped to remove some previously violent
offenders from the community. 88 There is, however, some question
whether the goal of treating mentally ill offenders has been adequately
served. Until recently, the Michigan courts had done nothing concrete
to further this objective. Thus, the treatment function frequently has
been described as illusory,8 9 and this major justification for the statute
remains unfulfilled. The 1981 case of People v. Mack, 90 however, suggests
that the Michigan courts stand willing to enforce the statutory right to
treatment and may signal movement toward full implementation of the
treatment model.
If implementation of the treatment function under the Michigan
statute has been inadequate, the Illinois statute presents even greater
obstacles to accomplishment of this objective. 9 1 The Illinois legislature
vested unlimited discretion in the Department of Corrections to determine when treatment is necessary. 92 Legislators, however, have presumably relied on representations by the proponents that those found guilty
but mentally ill would receive treatment. 93 Juries are likely to make the
same presumption 94 and defendants clearly believe they will receive
treatment. 95 Nevertheless, even though no statutory right to treatment
may exist, constitutional principles mandate a right to treatment for defendants found guilty but mentally ill.
V.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO TREATMENT

RIGHT TO TREATMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The Constitution offers some protection for prison inmates. In the
88 Perhaps this proposition should be disputed. One commentator asserts that the guilty
but mentally ill verdict has had no effect on the number of insanity acquittals in Michigan.
See Weiner, 'Guilty But Mentally Ill,' supra note 20, at 52.
89 People v. McLeod, No. 76-01672, 8 (Recorders Court Opinion, Detroit, Mich., Sept. 21,
1976), rev'd, 77 Mich. App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977), afjd, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909
(1980); Grostick, supra note 72, at 196 (the consequences of the guilty but mentally ill and
guilty verdicts are nearly identical).
90 104 Mich. App. 560, 305 N.W.2d 264 (1981).
91 See supra section III.
92 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b). For further discussion, see supra section III.
93 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
94 The guilty but mentally ill verdict "enables the jury to openl convict the defendant
(incarceration results) while ensuring that he receives mental health treatment ....
Thus,
the purpose . .- to provide mental health treatment to those who have violated ethical or
social norms-is well served by adoption of the [guilty but mentally ill verdict]." Comment,
supra note 15, at 309 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
95 See People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 200, 274 N.W.2d 17, 19 (1978) ("Defendant
indicated when he pled guilty but mentally ill that he did so because he wanted treatment.").
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area of health care, the Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment's proscription of "cruel and unusual punishment" generates a
right to medical treatment for prisoners. 96 The range of this protection,
however, is severely limited.
The current standard, promulgated in.Eslelle v. Gamble,97 permits
court intervention only when an inmate alleges "deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs" or an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain." 98 Prior to implementing this standard, federal courts had consistently held that only a showing that prison officials had abused their
discretion would justify judicial inquiry into the adequacy of prison
medical care.9 9
Despite the apparent malleability of both standards, the courts
have taken a more protective stance under Estelle. 100 The courts' role,
however, still remains limited. Thus, failure to provide an inmate with
drugs prescribed for his diagnosed heart ailment justified intervention, 10 1 but failure to accommodate an inmate who believed he needed
psychiatric care did not. 10 2 As these cases demonstrate, it is extremely
96 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The
theory underlying this extension of the eighth amendment is derived from the common law
view that "it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by
reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (citing
Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)).
97 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
98 Id. at 104-05; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).

99 The Tenth Circuit, as recently as 1969, stated the prevalent standard:
[T]he basic responsibility for the control and management of penal institutions, including the discipline, treatment, and care of those confined, lies with the responsible administrative agency and is not subject to judicial review unless exercised in such a manner as
to constitute clear abuse or caprice upon the part of prison officals.
Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969). This "hands-off" approach to prison
management was frequently applied when inmates sought redress for injuries allegedly
caused by inadequate or improper medical treatment. See Klein, Prisoners' Rights to Physical
andMental Health Care.- A Modem Expansion of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 7 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1, 7 (1978); Comment, Confronting the Conditionsof Confinement.: An Expanded Role for Courtrin Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 366 (1977);
Comment, ConstitutionalLau--The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1539

(1973).
100 See articles cited supra note 99. In the federal courts, actions under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act comprise the bulk of the successful prison reform cases. See Klein, supra note
99, at 10. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Federal jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), 2201 (1970).
101 Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972).
102 Flint v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1970).
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difficult to establish an individual eighth amendment claim for lack of
mental health treatment.
Although mental and physical care are technically measured under
the same standard, 10 3 the courts have been far less willing to recognize
eighth amendment violations in the mental health area, probably out of
concern that the symptoms of mental illness are easily feigned. On the
other hand, the classic case of unconstitutional prison conditions, Newman v. Alabama, 10 4 cited the inadequacy of psychiatric care as a major
factor in determining that these prison facilities violated the inmates'
eighth amendment rights.105 It is not possible to establish such massive
inadequacy in every case. As this section will demonstrate, the eighth
amendment standard accords inadequate protection to the treatment
interests of guilty but mentally ill defendants.
In the first major case concerning prisoners' right to treatment, the
Supreme Court both established the eighth amendment standard and
placed an important qualification upon it. In addition to requiring a
demonstration of "deliberate indifference to" medical needs or "wanton
infliction of pain," the Court held that no constitutional right was implicated by an inadvertent failure to provide adequate treatment. 10 6 Presumably, if it appears that prison officials have made a good faith effort
to deal with the prisoner's serious medical problems, the constitutional
mandate has been fulfilled. 07 Thus, there is no constitutional violation
when the alleged failure to treat involves, as it did in Estelle, a question
of disputed medical judgment. 0 8 The fact that a prisoner believes he or
she should be receiving a different type of treatment does not render the
treatment given constitutionally inadequate. 10 9
On the other hand, the complete failure to evaluate and treat a
serious illness has been held to violate inmates' eighth amendment
rights." 0 Similarly, treatment which is prescribed or administered with
103 See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Note, Prisoners' RightsBowring v. Godwin: The Limited Right of State Prisonersto Psrychologicaland Psychiatric Treatment,
56 N.C.L. REv. 612, 614 (1978) ("Though this standard for invoking the right to psychological and or psychiatric treatment may seem excessively restrictive, it is for the most part consistent. with the standards that have developed in the general area of medical care for
prisoners.").
104 349 F. Supp. 278, 284 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aft, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974),cert.denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975).
105 Id.
106 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
107 Note, supra note 103, at 615.
108 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
109 Id. One commentator remarked that the Estelle standard was "little more than a reaffirmation of the current amorphous standard adopted by several circuits proscribing 'deliberate indifference' to inmates' medical needs." Neisser, Is There a Doctor in theJoint? The Search
for ConstitutionalStandardsfor Prison Health Care, 63 VA. L. REV. 921, 922 (1977).
110 Id.; see Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979); see
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a "callous disregard"'I for the patient's welfare can be tantamount to
"intentional deprivation" of needed care 1 2 if it is extraordinary, shocking or barbaric."13 Thus far, only one circuit has required less than an
absence of "callous disregard" or "intentional deprivation" to state a
also Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th
Cir. 1957) (total denial of urgently needed medical care implicates eighth amendment); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974),cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Black v. Ciccone, 324 F. Supp. 129 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Ramsey v.
Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill.
1963).
111 Laamon v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 315 (D.N.H. 1977).
112 Pinon v. Wisconsin, 368 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (quoting Davis v. Schmidt,
57 F.R.D. 37,41 (W.D. Wis. 1972)); Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
Description of a few cases will help to demonstrate the difficulty of meeting the eighth
amendment standard.
Complete failure to attend to a prisoner's bullet wounds, which failure resulted ultimately in amputation' of his leg, was deemed sufficient to state a cause of action under the
Civil Rights Act in Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957). Allegations of improper or inadequate medical treatment were held insufficient to justify relief in habeas
corpus unless they were (1) continuing, (2) unsupported by any recognized competent school
of medical opinion, and (3) amounted to a denial of needed medical treatment. Ramres, 310
F. Supp. at 604. Under this standard, propounded six years before Estelle, petitioner's claim
was denied because his condition had been treated in an arguably competent fashion. Id.
Similar facts precluded relief for the petitioner in Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.
1970). Although needed surgery had been delayed, possibly causing permanent damage,
there could be no finding of cruel and unusual punishment where prison officials eventually
went outside the prison to supply treatment by a specialist.
In its first application by the Supreme Court, the callous disregard-deliberate indifference standard was held not to have been met by the prisoner's claim that treatment for his
back injury was inadequate. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The prisoner had received treatment from medical personnel seventeen times over the course of a three-month
period following his injury. The alleged failure to use additional diagnostic techniques or
different forms of treatment was deemed to be merely a matter of medical judgment; the
Court would not find callous disregard in the face ofsome efforts to treat, whether successful
or not. Id. at 107. At least one commentator sees the Estdle standard of "deliberate indifference" as requiring an independent showing of bad faith on the part of prison officials. Klein,
supra note 99, at 16.
Improper treatment, negligent treatment and failure to allow a prisoner to choose his
own doctor have also been held not to constitute eighth amendment violations. McCracken v.
Jones, 562 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917 (1978) (difference of opinion
between prisoner and medical staff insufficient to state a cause of action); Wester v. Jones, 554
F.2d 1285, 1286 (4th Cir. 1977) (doctor's negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference); Mason v. Ciccone, 531 F.2d 867, 872 (8th Cir. 1976) (denial of request to see a particular doctor is not cruel and unusual punishment); Massey v. Hutto, 545 F.2d 45, 46 (9th Cir.
1976) (mere disagreement over proper medical treatment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Tolbert, 434 F.2d at 626 (malpractice allegation does not suffice for constitutional claim). As one commentator put it, "[o]nly such intentional deprivations as would
be shocking to the conscience are unconstitutional. Under this standard, a prisoner is entitled
tosome, but not the best or even effective, treatment. For all practical purposes, even the most
rudimentary medical care facilities will meet the constitutional minimums." Note, supra note
103, at 619 (footnotes omitted).
113 See Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1970), affg 299 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal.
1969).
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cause of action under the eighth amendment; the Fourth Circuit, in
Blanks v. Cunningham,114 held that all prisoners have a right to reasonable
care and treatment.
As discussed above,"1 5 the prisoner's eighth amendment right to
treatment extends to mental as well as physical care.1 6 In spite of some
misgivings about its effectiveness, 1 7 there has been growing acceptance
of psychiatric and psychological disciplines; this acceptance has helped
to establish the legitimacy of prisoners' claims for mental health treatment." 8 Moreover, several institutional personnel consider psychiatric
illness to be the single most important problem in modern prisons. 119
In 1977, the Fourth Circuit, in the landmark case Bowring v. Godwin,120 extended the Estelle "deliberate indifference" standard and established that the eighth amendment right to mental health treatment is
identical to that for other aspects of medical care. The court concluded
that it could see no underlying distinction between the right to medical
care for physical ills and its psychological and psychiatric
2
counterpart.' '
Under the Bowring court's eighth amendment standard, a prisoner
is entitled to some psychological or psychiatric treatment
if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and
care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence serious disease or injury;
(2) that such disease is curable or may be alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care
114 409 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1969); see also Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977);
Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1975). At the district court level, see Laaman v.
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977).
115 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
116 Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979); Bowring
v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
117 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
118 Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979); Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977);
see also ABA, CriminalJustice Section Project on Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners,
§ 5.1 (Tent. Draft), in 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 466 (1977) ("Prisoners should be entitled to
proper medical services, including, but not limited to, dental, physical, psychological, psychiatric, physical therapy, and other accepted medical care.").
119 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (mental illness and
retardation are the prevalent medical problems in the Alabama prison system). See Petrick,
Rate of Psychiatric Morbidity in a Metropolitan City Jail Population, and Gibbs, Psychological and Behavioral Pathology in Jails: A Review of the Literature (Sept. 1978) (papers prepared for the Special National Workshop on Mental Health Services in Local Jails,
Baltimore, Md.), cited in Adler, From Hospital to Jail: New Challenges to the Law Enforcement
Process, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 319, 332 (1981).
120 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
121 Id. at 47.
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122
would be substantial.

In addition, the prisoner's serious medical needs must allegedly
have been treated with "callous indifference" to state an eighth amendment cause of action.1 23 The Bowring court acknowledged that although
the judiciary is "ill-equipped to prescribe the techniques of treatment,
this does not alter the fact that in many cases, treatment is obviously
called for and is available in some form. In such cases, the state cannot
124
arbitrarily refuse to provide relief."
Thus, it appears that guilty but mentally ill convicts will not likely
be in a better position than ordinary inmates to make eighth amendment claims for treatment. Estelle and its progeny require the inmate to
show "intentional deprivation" of a "serious" medical need; upon a
showing that the prison has made any effort to deal with the illness, the
court will reject the inmate's claim. 25 Since Illinois requires guilty but
mentally ill inmates to receive "periodic inquiry and examination to be
made concerning the nature, extent, continuance and treatment of the
defendant's mental illness,"' 2 6 cursory attention to this provision by the
Department of Corrections will probably prevent any eighth amendment challenge. Right to treatment claims have generally failed when
prison officials have made some attempt to treat. 127 By requiring evaluation and only that treatment which the Department of Corrections
deems necessary, 128 the Department's performance under the guilty but
mentally ill statute, however minimal, will probably meet the threshold
requirements of the eighth amendment. The Illinois legislature has thus
effectively insulated the Department of Corrections from eighth amendment right to treatment claims in all but the most flagrant cases of intentional or negligent mistreatment.
B.

RIGHT TO TREATMENT UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Guilty but mentally ill convicts may have a stronger right to treatment under the fourteenth amendment. A long line of cases has held
that the fourteenth amendment mandates treatment of civilly commit122 Id.; see also Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir.
1976); Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 311.
123 Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47.
124 Id. at 48 n.3.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 105-11.
126 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-2-6(b). Of the sixty defendants found guilty but mentally ill in Illinois, none are receiving special evaluation or treatment. Interview with Barbara
Weiner, Director of the Institute of Psychiatry and the Law (Apr. 4, 1983); see supra note 58.
127 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Bowring, 557 F.2d at 47-48; Mayfield v.
Craven, 433 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957);
Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970); see also infra note 128.
128 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b).
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ted mental patients, sexual psychopaths and juvenile offenders, 129 although the Supreme Court has not expressly confirmed their reasoning.
In Donaldsonv. O'Connor,130 the Fifth Circuit held that civil commitment
of persons found mentally ill and dangerous involves a "massive curtailment of liberty," which triggers strict due process analysis. 13 1 The court
concluded that civil commitment satisfies due process only if treatment
accompanies confinement. 132 It identified two important state interests
underlying civil commitment: protection of society and rehabilitation of
the mentally ill. The court concluded that the state may legitimately
confine an individual pursuant to itsparenspatriaeand police powers if it
provides treatment. "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon
the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process."' 133 A majority of the circuits have relied upon
34
or extended the Donaldson holding.'
Donaldson involved the rights of involuntarily committed individuals, but its rationale has been extended to protect the voluntarily committed 135 and mentally retarded, 36 as well as the criminally committed
129 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 452 U.S. 939 (1981),
vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Costello v.
Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976); Burnham v. Dep't of Public Health, 503 F.2d
1319 (5th Cir. 197 4), cert. deniedsub nom. Dep't of Human Resources of Georgia v. Burnham,
422 U.S. 1057 (1975); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Nelson v. Heyne,
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g
355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. J972), cert. denied, 417 U. S.
976 (1974); Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Ohlinger v. Watson, 28
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2321 (No. 78-3037, 9th Cir. 1980); Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp.
908 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Davis v. Watkins,
384 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
130 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), afdon other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
131 Id. at 520 (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (civil confinement
involves "massive curtailment of liberty")); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)
(massive curtailment of liberty implicates due process).
132 Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 520.
133 Id. at 521 (quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), a'dsub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)).
Ultimately the United States Supreme Court limited the Fifth Circuit's interpretation,
holding only that the state may not constitutionally confine any noncriminal who is neither
dangerous nor mentally ill. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). This ruling
reserved the issue of treatment for the civilly committed for subsequent consideration.
When the Supreme Court accepted the certiorari petition in Romeo v. Youngberg, 451
U.S. 982 (1981), it appeared that the Court would address precisely this issue. The Court's
ultimate decision, however, provided no additional guidance to the lower federal courts on
the fourteenth amendment right to treatment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
In fact, the Court did not face the right to treatment issue, having found that it had been
"dropped" from the case on appeal. Id. at 2459 n.23. For the time being at least, federal
courts are thus left to interpret for themselves the meaning of the fourteenth amendment's
right to treatment.
134 See cases cited supra note 129.
135 Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
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(insanity acquittees and defendants incompetent to stand trial),'13 7 juvenile offenders 38 and sexual psychopaths. 139 This extension of a fourteenth amendment right to treatment to contexts other than pure civil
commitment provides the foundation for a fourteenth amendment right
to treatment for the guilty but mentally ill.
The rationale underlying the Fifth Circuit's holding in Donaldson
was easily transferred from the context of involuntary to that of voluntary commitment. In Phih'bp v. Carey,140 the court reasoned that there
was no constitutionally significant difference between the rights of the
voluntarily and involuntarily committed. In both contexts, a major
asserted purpose was to rehabilitate the mentally ill; and in both categories some individuals were indefinitely confined for no criminal offenses. 14 1 These similarities led the court to conclude that the
42
voluntarily committed could not be confined absent treatment. 1
A more complex problem faced the courts when they extended the
fourteenth amendment right to treatment to juvenile offenders, sexual
psychopaths and the criminally insane. These circumstances, unlike
civil commitments, involve individuals who have violated the law, but
136 Romeo, 644 F.2d 147, 158; Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Flakes v.
Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis. 1981); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219
(E.D. La. 1976).
137 Ohlinger v. Watson, 28 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2321 (No. 78-3037, 9th Cir. 1980); Scott
v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (W-D. Ohia1974).
138 Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E. D. Tex. 1974), afdon other grounds, 536 F.2d
993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates
of Boy's Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
139 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
140 517 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
141 Id. at 518. The court recognized that although voluntarily committed individuals were
not confined by virtue of any power of the state, they were likely to be defacto restrained from
leaving by pressure of the institution, family and friends. Id.
142 Id. at 519. The court's holding was in the form of a denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim; it did not make any findings concerning the actual merits
of this case. Id. The court did not consider that those who were voluntarily committed had
voluntarily foregone the due process protections for which the quidpro quo of treatment was to
substitute in the context of involuntary commitment. The voluntarily committed arguably
may not be entitled to the same degree of protection as those committed against their will.
On the other hand, in both cases, the state has undertaken treatment. The Goldberg line of
cases has held that due process can be triggered when government terminates a benefit which
it has undertaken to provide. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension of high school student must be preceded by due process hearing);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license requires prior due process
hearing). Even if voluntary commitment triggers due process inquiry, the question remains
whether the same degree of process is due, exacting the same quidpro quo of treatment as that
required in involuntary commitments. The Phillip court implicitly answered this question in
the affirmative.
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upon whom society has chosen not to impose criminal liability. The
rationale of the pure civil commitment cases relied heavily upon the
absence of criminal conduct on the part of these plaintiffs. As the court
in Wyatt v. Stickney reasoned: "[t]he purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or
punishment. This is the only justification, from a constitutional stand-143
point, that allows civil commitments to mental institutions ....
Similarly, the court in Donaldson justified the right to treatment on the
grounds that "governments must afford a quidpro quo when they confine
citizens in circumstances where the conventional limitations of the criminal process are inapplicable."' 144 Nevertheless, the fourteenth amendment analysis used in Donaldson and Wyatt has not been restricted to
purely civil confinements.
By extending the right to treatment outside the strictly civil context, the courts have deemphasized the distinction between criminals
and non-criminals, relying instead upon the stated objectives of the confinement. 145 When the goals of confinement include treatment or rehabilitation as a major objective, a right to treatment has been found to
exist under the fourteenth amendment even if the objectives also include
46
punishment or prophylactic isolation from society.1
This extension may reflect an acknowledgement that the civil commitment standard undermines the distinction between civilly committed and criminally confined individuals. That standard requires a
committing judge to have found that the individual is mentally ill and
that he is likely to be dangerous to himself or others. 47 Clearly, considerations outside of humane and altruistic desires to rehabilitate enter
into this determination. Because the judge is required to find the subject potentially dangerous to himself or others, one can infer that the
purposes of commitment include confinement for the protection of society as well as rehabilitation. Thus, the distinction among the purposes
of confinement does not present as compelling a basis for distinguishing
rights to treatment as the earlier cases suggest.
One area in which the courts have eliminated the distinction alto143 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (emphasis in original), ad in parl, Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
144 Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 524. The court identified as the three central limitations missing
from civil commitment (1) that detention must be in retribution for a specified offense; (2)
that it be limited to a fixed term; and (3) that it be preceded by a process imbued with
fundamental procedural safeguards. Donaldson'squidpro quo analysis has not been accepted by
all the circuits.
145 Id. at 522.

146 See cases cited supra notes 138-42.
147 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458
(D.C. Cir. 1966); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 119 (1981).
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gether for right to treatment purposes is that of sexual psychopaths. In
Ohinger v. Watson 148 two sexual offenders challenged their indefinite
confinement without treatment on both eighth amendment and fourteenth amendment grounds. Notwithstanding its agreement with the
lower court that petitioners had not met their strict eighth amendment
burden, 49 the Ninth Circuit held that due process principles command
"adequate and effective treatment" for prisoners convicted as sexual
psychopaths. 150
The Ohlinger court closely considered the indeterminacy of the defendants' prison terms; underlying this factor, however, was a judgment
concerning the purpose of the confinement. The court reasoned that
confinement, whose purpose is essentially punitive, -must be analyzed
under the eighth amendment standard of stelle and Bowring because
"[i]ncarceration under those circumstances is primarily for punitive purposes.' 1 The state's interest, however, in creating this special status is
"to provide for the rehabilitation of a sex offender who has disclosed a
tendency to be a menace to society."' 52 Thus, when the state justifies
confinement on rehabilitative as well as punitive grounds, the four5 3
teenth amendment holds the state to a high standard of treatment.'
Like the Ohlinger defendants, guilty but mentally ill defendants are
not being sentenced "merely because they committed criminal offenses,
but also because they possess. . . 'a mental disturbance, delinquency or
'5 4
condition predisposing' them to the commission of . . . offenses."'
Furthermore, although they are not subject to indefinite imprisonment,
the stigma of their criminal convictions is compounded when they are
labelled "mentally ill.' 5 5 In light of this added stigma and in recognition of the likelihood that mental illness actually contributed to their
criminal behavior, guilty but mentally ill defendants should be guaranteed treatment which meets fourteenth amendment standards.
A similar line of reasoning justifies the right to treatment ofjuvenile
offenders. In Nelson v. Heyne,' 5 6 the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a juvenile correctional facility must provide rehabilitative treatment. The
28 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2321 (No. 78-3037, 9th Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 96-126 and accompanying text.
150 28 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) at 2321.
148
149

151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (Supreme Court recognized the additional

stigma of a prisoner's transfer to a mental hospital).
156 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); see also McRedmond v. Wilson,

533 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 298-99 (D. Md.
1979); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1140-41 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Lucas v. Wasser, 425
F. Supp. 955, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp.
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court construed the fourteenth amendment more broadly than did the
courts in Ohhnger or Donaldson. Ohlinger and O'Connor v. Donaldson both
focused on the indeterminate term of confinement; 15 7 Donaldson also
stressed that the non-criminal context of civil commitment justified a
right to treatment. 158 Although neither of these factors is present in the
incarceration of juvenile offenders, the court in Nelson nevertheless
found that
"[a] new concept of substantive due process is evolving in the therapeutic
realm. This concept is founded upon a recognition of the concurrency between the state's exercise of sanctioning powers and its assumption of the
duties of social responsibility. Its implication is that effective treatment
must be the quidpro quo for society's right to exercise its parenspatriae controls. Whether specifically recognized by statutory enactment or implicitly
requirements of due process, the right to
derived from the constitutional
15 9
treatment exists."

Under this theory, effective treatment is required whenever treatment or
rehabilitation is a major goal of confinement. The Nelson view is also
supported by the reasoning of Rone v. Fireman, which held that "whenever the provision of care and treatment is part of the purposefor confinement, such must be accorded consistent with due process."' 160 Thus, the
16 1
evolving fourteenth amendment standard announced in these cases
requires that whenever governments confine individuals for the express
203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 105, 119 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Collins v. Bensinger, 374 F. Supp. 273, 275 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
157 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 568 (1975); Ohlinger, 28 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) at
2321.
158 O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 568 ("A finding of mental illness alone cannot justify a state's
[A] state
locking a person up . .. and keeping him in simple custodial confinement ....
cannot constitionally confine without more a nondangerous individual. .. 2).
159 491 F.2d at 359 (quoting Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
160 473 F. Supp. 92, 119 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (emphasis added). The "purpose" test may be
criticized on the grounds that logic will not permit it to be confined to mentally ill offenders
and juveniles; after all, is not rehabilitation one of the stated goals of criminal imprisonment
generally? Why should not the right to rehabilitation be just as compelling for all corrections
populations? Although this "floodgates" argument is somewhat compelling, it overlooks two
distinguishing factors. First, the expectation of treatment is much greater when the premise
of the confinement is explicitly treatment, as in the civil commitment, juvenile offender and
guilty but mentally ill contexts. Second, the likelihood of "treatability" is much greater in
these contexts as well. Thus, wholesale treatment and rehabilitation are not necessarily called
for by the reasoning of these cases.
It is therefore possible to distinguish ordinary imprisonment from treatment-oriented
confinement and to conform to the Supreme Court's rejection of right to rehabilitation claims
by inmates. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 421 (1974); see also Pugh v. Locke, 406
F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("Courts have thus far declined to elevate a positive
rehabilitation program to the level of a constitutional right."). To the extent that rehabilitation remains one of the goals of "corrections," however, perhaps the distinction should be
reexamined and the goals of criminal punishment publicly adapted to society's unwillingness
to actively rehabilitate offenders.
161 See a/so cases cited supra note 156.
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purpose of treating them, they must receive constitutionally adequate

treatment.
Although it has been held that the function of ordinary criminal
incarceration is fulfilled even when a prison has no rehabilitative facilities, 16 2 a defendant convicted under the guilty but mentally ill statute is
in a different position than one who was simply found guilty.163 One of
the explicit purposes of the verdict is to effect treatment.164 The proponents of the legislation stated that the verdict is intended "to assure that

those who are responsible for their crimes are punished as well as
treated."' 65 In this respect, guilty but mentally ill defendants are similar
to sexual psychopaths who are also recognized offenders afflicted with
66
mental illness.'
There are, admittedly, other functions served by incarceration of

the guilty but mentally ill; however, there are also other functions served
by confinement of sexual psychopaths, juvenile offenders, and, to a lesser
extent, the non-criminal mentally ill. Confinement of members of these

latter categories is further justified by multiple purposes, including protection of society and deterrence. 167 Like members of these latter categories, the guilty but mentally ill are entitled to constitutionally
adequate treatment. 168
In determining the strength of a fourteenth amendment right to
162 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp.
1005, 1012-13 (N.D. Ga. 1968); see Klein, supra note 99, at 22. "
163 This distinction is somewhat problematic because it dismisses the rehabilitation function for the bulk of those serving time. For the purpose of the guilty but mentally ill, however, this discussion is just intended to suggest that the defendants have a particularly strong
claim to treatment. Such a preference can be challenged on grounds expressed in Newman v.
Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972). There the court noted that in the Alabama
prison system, it is estimated that 10% of the inmates were psychotic and another 60% are
disturbed enough to require treatment. Nevertheless, treatment preference for those found
guilty but mentally ill would be consistent with a policy of placing resources where they are
most desperately needed. It would also better comport with the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
164 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
165 Thompson, supra note 20, at 4 (emphasis added).
166 See, e.g., Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
167 See supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
168 The cases further dictate the character of treatment to be given. The object of treatment should be to give every committed person "a realistic opportunity to be cured or to
improve his or her mental condition." Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Sup. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974)
(quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), af'd sub noam. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)). The courts have looked particularly for three conditions in determining whether this goal has been met-a humane psychological and physical
environment, qualified staff in sufficient numbers and, most important, individualized treatment plans. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (on remand). If
the indicia of adequate treatment are not present, the hospital is, for legal purposes, "transform[ed]. . . into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense
.. ," raising due process and equal protection issues. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943,
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treatment, courts have primarily examined the statutory purpose for
confinement. 169 A right to individualized treatment consisting of a
" 'bona fide effort' to cure or improve the patient"' 170 has been read into
certain kinds of confinement, and failure to provide such treatment has
been held to state a cause of action. 171 The express treatment goal of the
guilty but mentally ill statute favors a strong treatment right for those
convicted pursuant to its terms.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Of the eight states creating the guilty but mentally ill verdict, only
72
two failed to provide for an unequivocal statutory right to treatment.
Instead, Illinois and New Mexico conferred broad discretion on their
Departments of Corrections to provide only that treatment they deem
73
necessary. 1
In the absence of an express or implied statutory right, guilty but
mentally ill inmates in Illinois and New Mexico must rely on the Constitution to vindicate their rights to treatment. Under established eighth
amendment standards, however, they will be unlikely to secure significant treatment. Current interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, on
the other hand, lends itself to a much stronger right to treatment. To
date, no such claim has been litigated in the state or federal courts. As
the proposal to establish the verdict on the federal level gains national
prominence, 74 however, these disposition and treatment issues will
likely lead the debate.
VICKI L. PLAUT
950 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rouse

v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
169 See cases cited supra note 129.
170 Covington v: Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (treatment for criminally insane); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aT'dsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,

503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
171 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

172 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (Supp.
1982).
173 Id.
174 U.S. DEP'T OF JuST., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL
REPORT, 540 (1981). Recommendation 39 reads: "The Attorney General should support or
propose legislation that would create an additional verdict in federal criminal cases of 'guilty
but mentally ill' modeled after the recently passed Illinois statute ... " Id. The Commentary states that the verdict
would enable federal juries to recognize that some defendants are mentally ill but that
their mental illness is not related to the crime they committed or their culpability for it.
It would also enable ajury to be confident that a defendant who is incarceratedas a result of its verdict

will receive treatmentfor that illness while confined.
Id. (emphasis added).

